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ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCING LITIGATION

•.. The total award to plaintiffs for costs and attorneys fees shall,
therefore, be $100,976.14. NRDC v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C.

1978).

The general rule in American courts has been that attorneys fees
may not be recovered unless either a specific judicial exception or a
statutory provision is applicable.' The 1975 United States Supreme
Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society'
limited the federal courts' equitable power to award attorneys fees to
two circumstances: where the losing party has acted in bad faith and
where the litigation creates a common benefit, the cost of which
should be shared by all persons benefiting from it. Environmental
litigation does not often fall within these judicial exceptions. Environmental plaintiffs seeking to finance the heavy costs of litigation
are consequently forced to rely on specific statutory provisions
which authorize an award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party. 3
One such provision is contained in section 1365 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 4 Section 1365(a) grants standing
to citizens groups who wish to bring suits mandating the enforcement of, and compliance with, the FWPCA. Section 1365(d) 6 pro1. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 420 at 425 (1975).
2. Id.
3. Save Our Sound Fisheries Assoc. v. Calaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 at 1139 (D.R.I.
1977) (SOSF II).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976).
5. 1365. Citizen suits.-(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this Act [33 USCS
§ §1251-13761 or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with
respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act [33 USCS § § 1251-1376]
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
6.
(d) The Court, in issuing any final order or any action brought pursuant to
this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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vides that attorneys fees may be awarded to any party in litigation
commenced under 1365(a). Other sections of 1365 set out stringent
notice provisions that must be complied with 7 and preserve the
jurisdictional options granted to litigants under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) 8 and 28 U.S.C. 133 .
Recorded decisions on the issue of payment of attorneys fees
under 1365(d) are scarce.'" However, two decisions on point illuminate some of the elements of a successful action to recover attorneys fees under 1365(d). l' This case note will explore those
elements. Briefly, there are two general requirements. First, the
action must have been jurisdictionally grounded in 1365(a), the
citizens suit provision of the FWPCA. Second, the award of attorneys
fees must serve the purpose intended by Congress in providing for
citizen suits in the FWPCA.
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Meeting the jurisdictional requirements of 1365(a) is a major
stumbling block for environmental plaintiffs who wish to recover
attorneys fees because the requirements of 1365(a) are much stricter
than the jurisdictional requirements under either the APA or 28
U.S.C. 1331. A case on point is Save Our Sound Fisheries Assoc. v.
Callaway (SOSF II).12 In an earlier action (SOSF I),' 3 plaintiffs
succeeded in enjoining the United States Army Corp of Engineers
(Corps) from dumping dredged spoil in coastal waters because the
permits required under the FWPCA and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act' ' (MPRSA) had not been obtained.
Plaintiffs later returned to court seeking an award of attorneys fees
and costs pursuant to 1365(d) of the FWPCA and a similar provision
in the MPRSA.' I
The Corps objected to plaintiffs request for attorney fees on the
ground that plaintiffs had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 1365(a) in the earlier action. The same objection had been
raised in the earlier action. The Corps challenge then was directed
specifically to plaintiff's failure to fulfill the notice requirements of
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).

8. 5 U.S.C. §551 (1976).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 3 and N.R.D.C. v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 3.
Save Our Sound Fisheries Assoc. v. Callaway, 387 F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974) (SOSF

I).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(4) (1976).
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1365(b) which requires sixty days notice to both the Environmental
Protection Agency and the polluter before suit is filed. In SOSF I,
the court avoided this issue by finding that jurisdiction was proper
under either the APA or 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In SOSF II, the court recognized the necessity of having to make a
decision on the jurisdictional issue. It first ruled that SOSF I had not
dispositively rejected jurisdiction under 1365(a), noting although
that the issue had been properly presented to the court in that
case.' 6 The court next found that it was necessary to decide whether
the strict notice requirements of 1365(b), which had not been complied with in SOSF I, presented an insurmountable jurisdictional bar
to the suit for attorneys fees under 1365(d). Neither of the two
statutory exceptions to the sixty days notice requirement applied. 1
The court found that the notice requirement was jurisdictional, but
that in this case the requirement was satisfied for two reasons. First,
had the defendants complied with the requirements of the FWPCA,
the MPRSA, or the National Environmental Policy Act,' I the plaintiffs would have known of defendants' proposed actions in advance so
as to have enabled them to give notice of their intention to file suit
without risking damage to the environment in the interim.' 9 Second,
the plaintiffs' continuing interest in the project dating from 1972
constituted a form of constructive compliance with the notice requirements.2 0
It seems clear that the notice requirements of 1365(b) are indeed
jurisdictional. 2 Even if a court finds jurisdiction to hear the environmental case under another statute, the notice requirements of
1365(b) must be met one way or another, or attorneys fees will not
be awarded. Courts have, however, allowed supplemental pleadings
filed 60 days after notice was given to fulfill the requirements of
1365(b), although the original complaint had been filed too soon. 2 2
There are two other jurisdictional requirements contained in 1365.
First, if the suit is brought against a private polluter, the defendant
must be allegedly in violation of an effluent standardor limitation.2 3
The definition of an effluent standard or limitation for the purpose
16. Id. 3 at 1140 and 1141.
17. Id. 3 at 1141 and 33 U.S.C. §1365(b)(2)
18. 42 U.S.C. § §4321-47 (1973).
19. Id. 3 at 1143.
20. Id 3 at 1144.
21. N.R.D.C. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C.
tration, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); But see
tary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974).
22. Montgomery Environmental Coalition v.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(i)(A) (1976).

(1976).

Cir. 1972); Mass v. U.S. Veterans AdminisConservation Soc'y of S. Vermont v. SecreFri., 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
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of 1365 is contained in 1365(f) which defines "effluent standard or
limitation" as being one of the following:
1. The general prohibition on discharges unless specifically permitted by some provision in the FWPCA. 2 4
on discharges which constitute the heart of
2. The basic limitations
25
the FWPCA.

26
3. Pretreatment and toxic pollutant standards.
4. Requirements which individual states may impose as a condition
of certifying an NPDES permit.2
5. Other conditions or limitations which the NPDES permit may
carry.

These are the only sections of the FWPCA which, when violated, will
support the jurisdictional requirements of a citizens suit under 1365.
Second, if the action is brought against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) itself, the action must be based on a failure of the
Administrator of the EPA (Administrator) to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the FWPCA.2 8 The definition of a nondiscretionary duty is problematical. A decision to omit a compound from
the toxic substances list is discretionary, 2 9 as is the Administrator's
decision not to invoke his emergency powers under section 1364 of
the FWPCA. 3 ° Enforcement of record-keeping and monitoring requirements under 1318(a)(A) and the directive in 1255(d) to develop
better waste treatment methods have also been held to be discretionary.' 1 Whether the Administrator's enforcement duties under
1319(a)(3) are discretionary appears to be a matter of some dispute,
but the better view is that the word "shall" in this section creates a
mandatory, non-discretionary duty.3 2
Finally, when the issue is not the Administrator's failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty but a citizen challenge to an affirmative agency action, the court will not entertain a suit under 1365. 3
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
33 U.S.C. § § 1311, 1312 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § § 1341, 1342 (1976).
33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(2) (1976).
N.R.D.C. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

30. Comm. For Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 387 F. Supp. 526
(D. Md. 19755.
31. Id.
32. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977), discretionary; I1. ex. rel. Scott v.
Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71 (D. IUl. 1977), nondiscretionary; S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v.
Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978), issuing an order of compliance-nondiscretionary, but bringing a civil suit-discretionary.
33. Sun Enterprises Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd 532 F.2d 280
(2nd Cir. 1976).
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Plaintiff may seek review under 1369 of the FWPCA, which provides
for judicial review of agency actions in the various United States
Court of Appeals, but a claim for attorneys fees will not lie under
1369.
It should be evident that the jurisdictional requirements of 1365
are formidable. They limit the contexts in which an environmental
plaintiff may bring suit unless he is able to independently finance the
litigation. Although 1365(e) preserves his jurisdictional options
under the APA and 28 U.S.C. 1331, only under 1365 can he recover
attorneys fees. The jurisdictional requirements of 1365 can be summarized as follows:
1. Notice must be given to all parties 60 days prior to the filing of
the suit. Filing a supplemental pleading after the 60 days have
run may serve to fulfill the notice requirement.
2. If the suit is against a private polluter, he must be in violation of
an effluent standard or limitation described in 1365(f).
3. If the suit is against the Administrator, it must be to compel the
performance of a non-discretionary duty.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Once the jurisdictional requirements of 1365(a) and (b) have been
met, the statute provides only the vague further suggestion that the
court may award attorneys fees whenever "the court determines that
such an award is appropriate." 3 4 A recent case, Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Costle,3 S clarifies some of the factors that the
courts are willing to take into account in awarding attorneys fees.
The case originated when environmental plaintiffs sought to compel the Administrator to perform certain non-discretionary duties
under the pretreatment and toxic discharges section of the
FWPCA. 3 6 A settlement agreement was ultimately reached which
proved to be of importance in the subsequent administration of the
FWPCA. There was no disagreement by either party as to the court's
jurisdiction under 1365.
Subsequently, both the environmental plaintiffs and industrial
intervenors returned to court seeking attorneys fees under 1365(d).
The court was forced to consider the propriety of awarding attorneys
fees in several different contexts.
The court rejected the claims of industrial interventors. These
intervenors included the American Mining Congress, Firestone, and
34. Id.at 4.
35. 12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C. 1978).
36. Ia
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Union Carbide. The court agreed that under 1365(d) the court had
broad discretion to award fees to any party "whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate." '3 ' However, the court recognized that the legislative history of the FWPCA provides some guidelines. Specifically, the court quoted committee reports 3 8 stating that
defendants in citizens suits actions under the FWPCA could be
awarded costs where the actions were brought against them were
either frivolous or for purposes of harassment. So, although the
court's discretion to award attorneys fees is generally broad, an
award of attorneys fees to defendants must be predicated on a finding that the defendants were the victims of a harassing or frivolous
action. 3 9
The industrial intervenors advanced a second, also unsuccessful,
argument. They suggested that 1365(d) represented a statutory
recognition of the judicially created "common benefit" rule for attorneys fees awards. Essentially, this claim was an effort by defendants to evade the confines of the "victim of a frivolous or harassing
suit" requirement. The court did not rule on the potential of
1365(d) as a statutory common benefit rule. But it found that even
if that construction was to be accepted as valid, defendants did not
meet the other jurisdictional requirements of 1365 because their
attorneys fees were largely accrued during their attempts to intervene
in the action. The court held that the Administrator's decision on
whether or not to allow intervention in a case is not covered by the
FWPCA and, consequently, no attorneys fees could be awarded
under the FWPCA. 4 0
With regard to the environmental plaintiffs, the court tacitly
agreed that the action had been in the public interest. 4 1 The court
then proceeded to engage in a meticulous examination of the billing
statements presented by the four environmental lawyers. A significant portion of the time claimed by plaintiffs attorneys was spent
in opposing the motions for intervention made by members of the
industry. 42 EPA also opposed intervention by members of the industry. In the suit for attorneys fees, EPA objected to the payment
of attorneys fees for the redundant opposition to intervention made
by plaintiffs. The Administrator's position was that in opposing these
motions after EPA had already opposed them, plaintiffs were no
longer acting out of public concern. 4 1 The court again turned to
37. Id. at 1182.

38. Id.at 1185, 1186.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1186.

41. Id.at 1182.
42. Id. at 1183.
43. Id
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congressional intent in order to resolve the issue. It found that in
allowing the payment of attorneys fees in citizen suits, Congress had
had two purposes:
First, Congress sought to encourage the use of the citizen suit as a
means of direct enforcement of the Act (FWPCA). Second, Congress
felt that the existence of the attorneys fees provision would
serve as
44
a dis-incentive to the filing of frivolous or harassing suits.
The court then held that permitting the payment of attorneys fees
for the opposition of industry intervenors did not serve the purposes
of the FWPCA, since the federal government had also opposed intervention. 4 In other words, the court found, plaintiffs' opposition
was no longer relevant to the enforcement of the FWPCA.
The court next considered whether the hourly rate charged by
each of the lawyers was reasonable. The rates ranged from $40 to
$80 an hour. The court found these rates to be within the usual rates
charged in the District of Columbia area and, therefore, acceptable.4 6 In SOSF II the court there ultimately reached this same
conclusion, although it had wrestled with the issue in more detail.4
The court also found that time spent on phone calls and conferences
would be accorded less weight than time spent on research and drafting.'
The court refused to compensate two of the attorneys for
large amounts of time spent on one project because it felt that an
award which included those blocks of time would not be reasonable.4 9 And the court decided that affidavits of reconstructed time
submitted by staff attorneys would be accepted in the absence of
evidence impugning their validity.' 0 Finally, time spent on the fee
application could be compensated at one-half the requested hourly
rate.' 1
'

CONCLUSION
Environmental plaintiffs who proceed under the citizen suit provisions of the FWPCA may seek an award of attorneys fees. They
must comply with the strict jurisdictional requirements of 1365.
Those requirements include giving 60 days notice to all parties before
filing suit and confining the suit to certain violations by pollutors or
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 1184.
Id at 1183.
429 F. Supp. at 1146.
12 E.R.C. at 1184.
Id
12 E.R.C. at 1185.
Id

686
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nondiscretionary omissions by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. When the jurisdictional requirements of
1365 have been met, a court has wide discretion in determining who
will receive an award. Defendants will not generally receive attorneys
fees unless they can demonstrate that they were the victims of a
harassing or frivolous action. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their
action was in the public interest and that it served the purpose as
intended by Congress of the citizen suit provision in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
GAIL GOTTLIEB MINTURN

